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NOTES
NOW YOU HAVE IT, NOW YOU DON'T: THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL AFTER
TEXAS V. COBB
Angela Henson'
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
the accused the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions.' The
Framers sought to provide added protection for the accused, such as the
right to counsel in capital crimes, which was not available under the
English system of law.2 Years later, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the assistance of counsel as a fundamental right,3 applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Since first hearing a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel case, the Court has extended the
scope of the protection beyond what the Framers likely envisioned.5 For
example, the Court views counsel as a necessity for guidance throughout
+ J.D. candidate, May 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. I would like to express sincere thanks to my expert reader, the Honorable Rosalind
Miller, for her assistance and insight on my Note. Also, I would like to extend my
gratitude to my parents and my husband for their encouragement and support.
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, 1215, 1216 n.2 (Lester S. Jayson et al. eds., 1973) (noting the intent of
the Framers to ensure that defendants who could afford to retain counsel would not lose
that right). In addition to the Sixth Amendment, Congress passed two acts which allowed
defendants to obtain counsel. Id.
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (explaining that the right to counsel's
assistance is fundamental in character).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (holding that "'certain
fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were
also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel
in a criminal prosecution"') (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44
(1936)).
5. See ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 1216 (pointing out that
the Court enlarged the protections of the amendment); see also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1(a) (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the expansion from a
mere right to retained counsel to the state's obligation to appoint counsel for indigent
defendants in some circumstances).
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the criminal process,6 as well as a medium between the accused and the
State.7
The Court's definition of the circumstances that trigger the attachment
of the constitutional right to counsel is somewhat malleable.'
Nevertheless, the Court established that the Sixth Amendment right
firmly attaches at arraignments,9  post-indictment lineups,"0  and
preliminary hearings." Further, the accused has the right to counsel's
presence at any interrogation that is initiated after adversary proceedings
are commenced. 2
Once the Sixth Amendment right has attached, the State has a duty
both to recognize and respect the accused's right to seek assistance.13
6. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (asserting the importance of the defendant's
ability to consult with and prepare a defense with counsel); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345
(recognizing the general inability of a layman to adequately assess and understand the
legal intricacies necessary to build an effective defense).
7. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 415 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to the lawyer as the medium between
the defendant and the government).
8. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (describing the commencement of
criminal proceedings in terms of the adversarial forces of the government immersing the
accused in the criminal law process); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224
(1967) (noting that the right to counsel cannot be constrained only to the trial, but rather
extends to other "critical" stages during the criminal process).
9. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (asserting that the right to assistance of counsel for critical
stages of the proceedings commences at the arraignment).
10. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37 (holding that the post-indictment lineup was a critical
point of adversarial proceedings requiring the presence of counsel).
11. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (discussing the right to have counsel
present at a preliminary hearing).
12. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that deliberately
elicited incriminating statements, which are the product of a post-indictment interrogation
held in the absence of counsel, are inadmissible at trial); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625, 632 (1986) (equating the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment's right to
counsel during custodial interrogations with the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee at
post-arraignment interrogations); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401 (providing for the right to legal
representation for the accused at any government interrogation which occurs after
criminal proceedings have begun). The Court deviated from the notion that the right only
attaches after indictment in Escobedo v. Illinois. See 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding
that even prior to indictment, where the accused requested and was denied counsel during
an interrogation, any statements made are inadmissible against the accused). 'The Court
reasoned that because confessions possibly determining the legal fate of the defendant
were often obtained prior to indictment, this constituted a critical stage for which legal
assistance was necessary. Id. at 488. Nevertheless, the Court has subsequently viewed
Escobedo as limited to the specific facts of the case. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (discussing the
Court's narrowing of Escobedo's holding); see also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.4(c)
(pointing to language in Escobedo as illustrating that the Court wanted to limit the ruling).
13. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1985) (identifying the obligations
imposed on the State by the Sixth Amendment); see also 21 A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
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Moreover, police and prosecutors have an obligation to avoid tactics that
may circumvent the protections guaranteed by the right to counsel.4
However, even after the right to counsel has attached, a defendant may
effectively waive the right.15
The establishment of the fundamental right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment has created tensions with society's interest in effective law
enforcement. 16 The Court's recent decisions, however, show a trend of
favoring law enforcement goals, while limiting the protection of the
constitutional right to counsel. 7 In McNeil v. Wisconsin,8 the Court
advocated the use of an offense-specific rule, which limits the attachment
of counsel to offenses where formal criminal proceedings have been
initiated.' 9 The Court justified McNeil's rule by espousing the interests of
the police and society in efficient crime solving.0
§ 1186 (1998) (summarizing the implications of the attachment of the right to counsel as a
limit on the authorities).
14. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171; see also Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632 (discussing the
distinction between police information gathering techniques before and after the
attachment of the right to counsel); 21A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13 (explaining the duties
of the State after the Sixth Amendment is implicated).
15. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding that the State must prove
"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" for a
waiver to be effective); see also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.4(f) (observing that a
defendant may waive his right to counsel in absence of counsel's participation).
16. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) (observing that society would
be disadvantaged if police access to uncoerced confessions was limited); Moulton, 474 U.S.
at 180 (positing that the exclusion of evidence relating to an uncharged offense, which is
obtained during the investigation of a charged offense, would hamper society's interest in
investigating crimes); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority's use of the exclusionary rule ignores the cost that will be suffered by society); see
also Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 35, 62 (1991) (discussing the Court's tendency to favor law
enforcement).
17. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175 (establishing that the right to counsel provision in the
Sixth Amendment is offense-specific and therefore only attaches to offenses for which a
prosecution has commenced); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1988) (finding
that the defendant's failure to request the assistance of counsel in post-indictment dealings
with the police rendered a Jackson-type exclusion inapplicable).
18. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
19. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175 (explaining that invocation of the right in a charged
offense cannot extend to future or uncharged offenses).
20. Id. at 175-76; see also Kenneth P. Jones, Comment, McNeil v. Wisconsin:
Invocation of Right to Counsel Under Sixth Amendment by Accused at Judicial Proceeding
Does Not Constitute Invocation of Miranda Right to Counsel for Unrelated Charge, 26 GA.
L. REv. 1049, 1058-59 (1992) (discussing the Court's policy rationale behind McNeil as
focusing on law enforcement goals of crime solving).
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The McNeil offense-specific rule formed the basis for the Court's
decision in Texas v. Cobb.21  In Cobb, the defendant appealed a
conviction of capital murder.2 Raymond Levi Cobb was a suspect in a
burglary and missing persons incident. 3 Eventually, the state charged
Cobb with burglary and appointed counsel for him.24 After his release on
bail, Cobb confessed to his father that he had murdered one of the
occupants of the burglarized home.-' Based on the statement from his
father, the police took Cobb into custody, where he subsequently
confessed to the murder of Margaret Owings and her sixteen-month old
daughter, Kori Rae.26
In Cobb, the Court considered whether a defendant's right to counsel
attaches only to charged offenses or extends to other offenses "closely
related factually"2'7 to the offense charged.28 In clarifying McNeil's
offense-specific rule, the Court determined that the right to counsel only
attaches to charged offenses, unless the charged and uncharged offenses
constitute the same offense under the test established in Blockburger v.
United States,29 which was later applied in double jeopardy cases. 3°
This Note explores the Court's jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. First, this Note reviews the case law evolution from a
broad view of the right to counsel during an interrogation, to an
increasingly narrow interpretation culminating in the offense-specific
rule. Next, this Note analyzes the various opinions in Texas v. Cobb.
Finally, this Note concludes that the offense-specific rule, as determined
by application of the Blockburger test, diminishes the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and derogates the role of the defense
attorney.
21. 532 U.S. 162,164 (2001).
2Z Id. at 166.
23. Id. at 165.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 167 (quoting Cobb v. Texas, No. 72,807, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at
*6 (Mar. 15,2000), rev'd, 532 U.S. 162 (2001)).
28. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167.
29. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (establishing "same elements" test, which determines
whether there are one or more offenses by comparing the statutory provisions to see if one
crime requires proof of a fact that the other provision does not).
30. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173.
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I. THE EROSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE INTERROGATION
CONTEXT
Early in the 1930s, the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental
nature of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.3 ' The Court's decision
in Powell v. Alabama32 acknowledged the complexities of the criminal
justice system, and the likely inability of a layperson to adequately
defend himself against government prosecution.33 Moreover, in Massiah
v. United States,34 the Court asserted that the right to counsel was not
limited to trial, but extended to other "critical stages" of prosecution,
including interrogations.35
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932). Powell involved a group of African-
American defendants charged with raping two white women in Alabama. See id. at 49, 51.
On the day of the trial, the defendants did not receive a formal designation of counsel. Id.
at 56-7. An attorney from another state, who had no pre-trial preparation or interaction
with the defendants, expressed his willingness to represent the defendants at trial, and the
court allowed the representation. See id. 57-8. The Supreme Court found that the
representation was inadequate and thus failed to satisfy the Sixth Amendment counsel
requirements. Id. at 71. The trial became infamous as "The Scottsboro Boys" case. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); People v. Nation, 604
P.2d 1051, 1056 (Cal. 1980).
32. 287 U.S. at 71 (holding that in instances where the defendant cannot employ
counsel, the court has a duty to appoint counsel in a capital case, whether requested by the
defendant or not).
33. See id. at 69; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 -63 (1938) (noting that a
lack of familiarity with the trial process would unfairly disadvantage a defendant).
34. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (finding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
violated when incriminating statements were elicited from an uncounseled defendant after
indictment). Massiah was indicted on a narcotics charge for transporting cocaine. Id. at
201-02. He obtained counsel and was released on bail. Id. at 202. A co-defendant,
Colson, agreed to aid the police by allowing them to monitor conversations with Massiah.
Id. at 201-03. During one conversation in Colson's car, Massiah made incriminating
statements, which were used against him at trial. Id. at 203. Massiah was convicted for the
narcotics charges, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Id. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the uncounseled statements, obtained
during a surreptitious interrogation, were erroneously used in trial against Massiah. See
id. at 206-07.
35. Id. at 204-06; see also Meredith B. Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The
Sixth Amendment as a Mere "Prophylactic Rule," 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1211-12
(discussing the "critical stage" inquiry and noting the Court's recognizing post-indictment
interrogations as a "critical stage"). In Powell, the Court indicated that there are other
"critical stages" in the criminal process, aside from trial, where counsel's assistance is vital.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 57. Moreover, the Court asserted that a defendant needs the aid of
counsel during all adversarial proceedings. Id. at 69.
The Wade Court expanded on the concept of "critical stages" by stating:
[T]oday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In
recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have
1363
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A. A Broad Scope for Application of the Right to Counsel
In Michigan v. Jackson,' the Supreme Court held that any defendant's
waiver during a police-initiated interrogation was invalid if obtained after
the defendant's prior assertion of the right to counsel.37 Jackson involved
two separate cases38 consolidated by the Michigan Supreme Court.39 In
each case, the government obtained incriminating statements from the
defendants after arraignment in the absence of counsel.4 Thus, both
cases presented the issue of whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel
was possible after arraignment.4' The Michigan Supreme Court held the
waivers to be invalid.42 As a result, the statements of both defendants
were inadmissible because they were obtained post-arraignment, after
the right to counsel had attached.43
In affirming the decision, the United States Supreme Court based part
of its reasoning on precedent that analyzed the Fifth Amendment's right
to counsel during a custodial interrogation." The principal case upon
construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the
proceedings.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); see also 32 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §
714 (1995) (describing the factors the Court considers for the "critical stage"
determination). But see Sherry F. Colb, Why the Supreme Court Should Overrule the
Massiah Doctrine and Permit Miranda Alone to Govern Interrogations, FindLaw's Writ, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20010509. html (May 9, 2001) (arguing that Massiah
should no longer be the standard for protecting a defendant's right to counsel in the
interrogation context, but rather Miranda should provide the protection).
36. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
37. id. at 636.
38. See generally People v. Bladel, 325 N.W.2d 421, 422 (Mich. App. 1982) (per
curiam) (reversing conviction and remanding for new trial), rev'g 308 N.W.2d 230 (Mich.
App. 1981), affd, 365 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. 1984), affd sub nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625 (1986); People v. Jackson, 319 N.W.2d 613, 620-21 (1982) (affirming the
conviction for murder), rev'd, 365 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. 1984), affd, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). In
Bladel, the defendant was arraigned and had requested counsel prior to his confession.
Bladel, 308 N.W.2d at 231. In Jackson, the defendant requested counsel at his
arraignment, but not during the police questioning. Jackson, 319 N.W.2d at 614, 617.
39. See People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Mich. 1984), affd sub nom. Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (discussing the common issue presented by the two cases).
40. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626, 628 (1986) (summarizing the Michigan
Supreme Court's findings).
41. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d at 58; see also Jackson, 475 U.S. at 626.
42 See Bladel, 365 N.W.2d at 68-9 (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment protection
requires stringent measures to obtain a valid waiver of the right to counsel, and finding the
requirement not met in these cases).
43. Id. (noting that a request of counsel to a magistrate at an arraignment is sufficient
to prohibit police questioning in the absence of counsel).
44. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629-30; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)
(establishing the procedure to be followed in an interrogation where the defendant
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which the Court relied was Edwards v. Arizona.4 5 The rule in Edwards
established that when the accused is in custody and requests to interact
with the police only through counsel, the police are barred from
subsequent interrogation until the accused has obtained counsel, unless
the accused initiates further interaction.6
The Jackson Court decided that the Edwards rule protecting the
accused during custodial interrogation also applied to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in post-arraignment questioning.47
Therefore, at a post-arraignment interrogation, a valid waiver of the right
to counsel can only occur if the accused initiated the conversation with
authorities.4
requests the aid of counsel); Edwards v. United States, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)
(providing that once a defendant requests counsel, the police cannot initiate questioning
and obtain a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment right). Although not a Fifth
Amendment case, the Jackson Court also cited United States v. Gouveia for an enunciation
of the events that trigger the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right. Jackson, 475 U.S.
at 629-31 (citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984)). In Gouveia, the Court
found the Sixth Amendment was not violated. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187. Gouveia
involved defendants who were in prison for another crime when they were suspected of
murdering an inmate. Id. at 182-83. They were placed in administrative detention and
remained in that situation without the appointment of counsel for nineteen months prior
to their indictment. Id. at 183. They were appointed counsel at a later arraignment, and
before trial, moved to have the indictments dismissed. Id. Their motion was denied, and
eventually they were convicted. Id. In their appeal, the defendants argued that their Sixth
Amendment rights were violated because they were denied counsel during their
confinement. See id. at 185. The Court of Appeals reversed their convictions, despite the
fact that the defendants were not indicted at the time when they asserted their right to
counsel. See id. at 186-87. The court distinguished Gouveia from Kirby v. Illinois by
asserting that Gouveia was a prison case, and therefore the right to counsel was implicated
differently. Id. at 185 (distinguishing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)). The Supreme
Court rejected the lower court's reasoning and reversed the decision, noting that there is
no distinction as to the right to counsel for prison cases from any other type of case. See
id. at 187.
45. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487 (holding the waiver of the right to counsel invalid); see
also Jackson, 475 U.S. at 630-32, 636 (finding the rule established in Edwards applicable to
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
46. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486-87; see also 2 LAFAvE, supra note 5, § 6.9(f) (describing
the prophylactic nature of Edwards in protecting a defendant from interrogation by police
after invoking counsel). In Minnick v. Mississippi, the Court determined that consulting
with counsel, pursuant to a request made during an interrogation, would not end Edwards'
protection. 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990). If the police initiate questioning after a defendant
has requested counsel, the resulting waiver is invalid if the attorney is not present, even if
the defendant had met with counsel between interrogations. See id. at 151-52.
47. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632 (noting that the Sixth Amendment right requires the
same level of protection as Fifth Amendment custodial interrogation rights); see also
Halama, supra note 35, at 1220 (reviewing the expansion of Edwards beyond the custodial
interrogation).
48. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 635-36.
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B. Drawing Distinctions That Limit the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel
Two years after deciding Jackson, the Court reviewed another case
involving a questionable waiver of the right to counsel. 49 In Patterson v.
Illinois, ° the Court upheld the defendant's waiver." The Court
distinguished both Jackson and Edwards on the ground that Patterson
did not expressly request the assistance of counsel at his post-
arraignment interrogation.52
Further, the Court found the waiver was "knowing and intelligent"53
because the police informed Patterson of his rights through a Miranda
warning."4 The Court reasoned that the Miranda warning adequately
informed Patterson of his right to counsel, as well as apprised him of the
consequences of a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right.55 The Court
explained, "[W]e have defined the scope of the right to counsel by a
pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the
particular proceeding, and the dangers to the accused of proceeding
without counsel. 5 6 Thus, the Court analogized the usefulness of counsel
at a post-arraignment interrogation with the utility of counsel at a
custodial interrogation and found the Miranda warning to be equally
sufficient in both contexts.57
49. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988) (holding the waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to be valid if obtained after Miranda warnings are issued to defendant).
50. 487 U.S. 285 (1988). A Cook County grand jury indicted Patterson for murder.
Id. at 288. The police informed Patterson of his Miranda rights, and he signed waiver
forms prior to making two confessions to police. Id. Patterson did not request the
assistance of counsel at any time while issuing the statements. See id. at 291.
51. Id. at 293.
52. See id. at 290-91. The Court asserted that a defendant who has obtained, or
merely requested, counsel will enjoy heightened constitutional protections unavailable to
defendants like Patterson, who did not have, or ask for, counsel. Id. at 290 n.3.
53. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (describing the requisite factors a
court must look to in determining whether a defendant made an informed waiver of
constitutional rights).
54. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292.
55. Id. at 292-93 (finding that the waiver met the requirements established in Zerbst);
see also Halama, supra note 35, at 1221 (noting that the Court found a valid waiver of
Miranda rights sufficient to support a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel).
56. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298; see also Halama, supra note 35, at 1221-22 (describing
the Court's test for assessing waivers of counsel as a spectrum based upon the importance
of legal assistance in a particular proceeding).
57. See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298-99; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432
(1986) (reasoning that the potential for an interrogation to have an impact on the trial is
not enough to automatically implicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). In
Burbine, the defendant, Burbine, had been arrested for burglary and was also a suspect for
2002] The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel After Texas v. Cobb
C. The Offense-Specific Rule: A More Expansive Limitation on the Right
to Counsel
Later variation on the validity of waivers for Sixth Amendment
purposes occurred in McNeil v. Wisconsin.8 In McNeil, the issue was
whether the attachment and assertion of the Sixth Amendment right for
a charged offense automatically invokes the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel for a different offense.59 In addressing this issue, the Court
created the offense-specific limitation on the Sixth Amendment.6°
While explaining the offense-specific limitation, the Court noted that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not triggered until the initiation
of a prosecution.6' Consequently, invocation of the Sixth Amendment
a murder. Id. at 416. Prior to indictment on either charge, Burbine's sister retained
counsel for him. Id. at 416-17. However, when Burbine's counsel attempted to contact
him in jail, the attorney was unable to speak to Burbine, and was informed by a police
officer that Burbine would not be questioned or put in a line-up that night. Id. at 417.
Additionally, counsel was not informed that Burbine was a suspect for murder. See id.
Contrary to the officer's statement to counsel, Burbine was questioned about the murder
the same night. Id. Burbine was issued the Miranda warning and never requested the
assistance of counsel. Id. at 417-18. However, the police did not inform Burbine that
counsel had been obtained for him and had tried to contact him. Id. at 418. During the
interrogation, he eventually signed three statements confessing to the murder and was
later convicted. Id. The Supreme Court decided that Burbine's waivers were valid
regardless of the failure to inform him that his counsel had attempted to contact him. Id.
at 423. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the misinformation given to Burbine's counsel
was irrelevant to the validity of the waivers. See id. at 424-25.
58. 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). McNeil was arrested for an armed robbery that
occurred in West Allis, Wisconsin. Id. at 173. He had counsel at his initial appearance
before the Milwaukee County Court. Id. A Milwaukee County detective talked to
McNeil, while in jail, about a set of crimes for which McNeil was a suspect in the town of
Caledonia, Wisconsin. Id. The Milwaukee and Caledonia detectives initiated several
encounters with McNeil in which he made incriminating statements about his involvement
in the Caledonia offenses. Id. at 174. Yet, during each encounter, McNeil was issued
Miranda warnings, and he signed waivers. Id. at 173-74. McNeil was formally charged
with the Caledonia crimes, and his statements were used in trial against him. See id. at
174. McNeil argued that his statements should have been suppressed because his
appearance in court with his attorney for the West Allis charges served as an invocation of
his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Id. He argued further that the waivers were
invalid because the police initiated the questioning that produced the inculpatory
statements. See id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that a request for counsel
on a charged offense does not invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and does not
invalidate all future waivers. See id. at 175.
59. Id. at 173.
60. Id. at 175.
61. Id.; see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that a prosecution is commenced "at or after the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings -- whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment"); Jones, supra note 20, at 1056-57 (discussing the
point of attachment of the right to counsel).
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right in one prosecution will not extend the right to future judicial
criminal proceedings.62 The Court reasoned that the limitation promotes
the government's interest in effective criminal investigation.63 The Court
asserted that excluding evidence related to an uncharged crime, while
interrogating the accused about a pending prosecution for another
offense, would unnecessarily hamper society's interest in solving crimes.
64
The Court also decided the offense-specific rule applied to Jackson's
determination of waiver validity in interrogations initiated by the police.
65
Additionally, the Court stated that the Edwards Fifth Amendment
right to counsel rule is not offense-specific.6 Regardless of the subject
matter of the questioning, police are barred from initiating any contact
with the accused if counsel is not present.67 The Court justified the
disparity in applying the offense-specific limitation to the Sixth
Amendment and not the Fifth Amendment by considering the interests
underlying the two amendments."'
For the Sixth Amendment, the protection is perceived as giving the
accused assistance against the government after it has commenced• 69
prosecution. The Court noted the existence of a presumption that the
accused can request the assistance of counsel for any critical point in the
criminal proceedings.70 However, this presumption applies to the defense
62. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175; see also Patrick A. Tuite, Supreme Court Ruling
Construes Right to Counsel Narrowly, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 24,1991, at 3 (noting the
limitation on the Sixth Amendment right to charged offenses).
63. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 179-80
(1985)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 175.
66. Id. at 177; see also Garcia, supra note 16, at 74 (reviewing the Court's distinction
between Jackson and Edwards).
67. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176-77; see also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 684 (1988)
(asserting that the Edwards protections cover any topic of police initiated questioning);
Jones, supra note 20, at 1057 (stating the distinction on permissible questioning between
the Sixth Amendment right and the Miranda-Edwards, right to counsel).
68. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177-78; see also Garcia, supra note 16, at 74-5 (elaborating on
McNeil's distinction between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment's counsel protections);
Jones, supra note 20, at '1058 (discussing the distinct purposes of the right to counsel
afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
69. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177-78 ("The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel
guarantee -- and hence the purpose of invoking it -- is to 'protect the unaided layman at
critical confrontations' with his 'expert adversary,' the government, after 'the adverse
positions of government and defendant have solidified' with respect to a particular alleged
crime.") (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
70. Id. at 1.79; see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986); 21A AM. JUR.
2D, supra note 13, at 1192 (discussing the presumption of a request for assistance at all
critical stages).
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of the present prosecution, and is not an implication of intent to avoid all
future interrogations on any subject matter.'
In contrast, the Fifth Amendment's Miranda-Edwards protection
focuses on the accused's interests in interacting with the authorities only
with counsel present." In the Fifth Amendment context, there is no
presumption of a request for counsel. Rather the accused must clearly
express a desire to have counsel present. 3
The Court rejected the policy argument that invoking the Sixth
Amendment right should serve as an implication of the Fifth
Amendment right established in Miranda.74 Recognition of such a rule,
the opinion indicated, would "seriously impede effective law
enforcement."75 The offense-specific limitation on the Sixth Amendment
right would continue to allow investigations of other, uncharged offenses,
thereby, aiding in efforts to solve other crimes."
The progression in jurisprudence illustrates an increased constraint on
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] 7 The president of the National
Association of Criminal Defense, Alan Ellis, commented that McNeil
was further evidence of the Court "tearing down the building blocks that
form the foundation of the Bill of Rights. 7M The change in the Court's
views indicates that effective and efficient law enforcement goals have
71. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180 n.1.
72. Id. at 178; see also Tuite, supra note 62, at 3 (reporting the Court's perception of
the Edwards guarantee).
73. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178-79; see also Jones, supra note 20, at 1058 (pointing to
the need for an assertion of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel); Tuite, supra note 62,
at 3 (stating that a defendant must express the desire to have counsel's aid).
74. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180; see also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.9(f) (describing the
Court's rejection of having a Sixth Amendment right invocation serving as an automatic
invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel). The policy argument supporting the
implied dual invocation was that the average defendant does not recognize the distinction
between the two counsel rights. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180 n.1. Thus, it is not fair to protect
only the defendants who are savvy enough to invoke both the Sixth and the Fifth
Amendment rights separately. See id.
75. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180.
76. See id. at 181; see also Tuite, supra note 62, at 3 (reporting the Court's fear of
restricting the police department's ability to resolve other crimes).
77. See Garcia, supra note 16, at 103 (discussing the apparent decline in the
protection of the right to counsel between Jackson and Patterson).
78. Ethan Bronner, Power to Query Suspects Widened; Questions Allowed on
Unrelated Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 1991, at 3 (summarizing the Court's decision
in McNeil).
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greater weight than the protection of the accused's right to legal
assistance. 79
II. TEXAS V. COBB: EXTENDING THE OFFENSE-SPECIFIC RULE TO
FACTUALLY RELATED OFFENSES
Raymond Levi Cobb was convicted of capital murder under Texas
Penal Code section 19.03"" and sentenced to death.81 On December 27,
1993, Mr. Lindsey Owings reported to the Walker County Sheriff's
Office that his home was burglarized and his wife and daughter, who
were in the house at the time of the break-in, were missing. 2 The police
questioned Raymond Cobb, a neighbor of the Owings, about the incident
in February 1994, but he denied any involvement.83
In July 1994, while Cobb was under arrest for an unrelated crime, he
confessed to the burglary of the Owings' home, but maintained he was
not involved in the disappearance of Margaret and Kori Rae. 4 The
government subsequently indicted Cobb under Texas Penal Code section
30.02" for burglary, and the court appointed Hal Ridley as counsel in
August 1994. 6  The Walker County investigators obtained Ridley's
permission twice to question Cobb regarding the disappearances, only
after the police asserted that Cobb was not a suspect. 87 In both the
August 1994 and September 1995 interrogations, Cobb insisted that he
was not involved in the disappearances of Margaret and Kori RaeY"
In November 1995, while living in Odessa, Texas, Cobb confessed to
his father that he had murdered Margaret Owings." Cobb's father filed a
statement with the Odessa police regarding the confession, which the
79. Garcia, supra note 16, at 75 (noting the McNeil Court's assertion of the strong
interest of the government in crime control).
80. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon 1994) (requiring murder of more
than one person during a single criminal transaction for a conviction of capital murder).
81. Cobb v. Texas, No. 72,807, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *1 (Mar. 15, 2000),
rev'd, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
82. Id. at *6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1994) (requiring non-consensual
entry into a habitation or building with the intent to commit a felony or theft).
86. Cobb, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *6.
87. Id. at *7.
88. Id.
89. Id. While Cobb was attempting to take items from the Owings' home, Margaret
approached him, and he stabbed her in the stomach with a knife. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S.
162, 165-66 (2001). Cobb then buried her body in the woods near the house, along with
her sixteen-month-old daughter. See id. at 166.
1370 [Vol. 51:1.01
2002] The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel After Texas v. Cobb
Odessa police faxed to Walker County) 0 The Walker County authorities
faxed an arrest warrant to the Odessa police, who then took Cobb into
custody and issued the Miranda warnings to him, which he subsequently
waived.9' Walker County did not inform the Odessa police that Cobb
had been appointed counsel for the pending burglary charge.9 During
the questioning, Cobb gave a written statement confessing to both
murders. 93
The Texas trial court convicted Cobb of capital murder and sentenced
him to death.94 Cobb appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
asserting eleven points of error,95 including a claim that his confession to
the Odessa police was erroneously admitted into evidence.96 Cobb
argued that the statement was obtained in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right because his counsel was not notified prior to, nor
present during, the questioning.w
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the murder was
factually related to the burglary charge and therefore the right to counsel
had attached for the murder offense when Cobb was indicted and
appointed counsel for burglary.98 As a result, the appellate court ruled
that the statement was inadmissible because it was obtained when Cobb's
counsel was not present.99 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.'O° The
90. Cobb, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *7-8.
91. See id. at *8.
92. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the constitutional right to
counsel requires the knowledge of one state actor to be imputed to another state actor. Id.
at *11. Thus, it was irrelevant that the Odessa police were not actually informed of Cobb's
retention of counsel in the burglary because the law imputes the knowledge to them. See
id. The Executive Director of National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO),
Robert T. Scully, argued that such a presumption of knowledge would place an enormous
burden on government officials and inhibit effective law enforcement. See Stephen
McSpadden, U.S. Supreme Court Hears Texas Murder Case (Jan. 16, 2001), at
http://www.napo.org/texas_murder.htm (announcing NAPO's filing of a brief stating its
position on Texas v. Cobb).
93. Cobb, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *8.
94. See id. at *1.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *5.
97. Id. at *5-6. The State of Texas countered Cobb's argument by asserting that
Cobb's right to counsel for the murder had not attached. Id. at *5. Even if the ight had
attached, the State argued that Ridley's consent to the prior uncounseled interrogations
served as a waiver of the right. Id. at *5-6.
98. Id. at *11.
99. Id. at *11-12.
100. Id. at *13.
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State of Texas sought review in the United States Supreme Court, 1
which granted certiorari,1t 2 and subsequently reversed the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals decision."3
A. The Majority Opinion: Reaffirming McNeil's Offense-Specific
Limitation and Holding That Cobb's Incriminating Statements Were
Properly Admitted as Evidence Against Him
In Texas v. Cobb,' the Court considered whether a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only to charged offenses or also to
additional offenses "closely related factually"'0 5 to the charged offense.""
The Supreme Court made three significant rulings. °W
1. Reaffirming McNeil's Offense-Specific Rule
The Court reaffirmed McNeil's offense-specific limitation on the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."" The opinion strongly admonished lower
courts that McNeil v. Wisconsin,'" which established the offense-specific
limitation on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, "meant what it
said.""0 The Court relied on its prior holding in McNeil, that statements
by a defendant relating to uncharged offenses are admissible even
though the right to counsel had attached for a charged offense."'
101. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167 (2001).
102. Texas v. Cobb, 530 U.S. 1227 (2000).
103. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174.
104. 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
105. Cobb, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *10. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals based its Sixth Amendment analysis on cases that allowed counsel to extend to
factually related crimes. Id. at *10-11 (relying on State v. Frye, 897 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995); Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), abrogated by
State v. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. 1994); and United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d
37 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001)).
106. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167. Another issue relating to the validity of Cobb's waiver of
counsel was also identified; however, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the second
question. Id.,
107. See generally Cobb, 532 U.S. at 164-174 (reaffirming the offense-specific rule,
rejecting the "closely factually related" exception of the lower courts, and adopting the
Blockburger offense test).
10& Id. at 164; see also Kathleen Dolegowski, Right to Counsel Is Offense Specific:
Right Attaches to Offenses Meeting Blockburger Test, 3 LAW. J. 2 (2001) (reporting Court's
holding).
109. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
110. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 164.
111. Id. at 167-68; see also McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175; Dolegowski, supra note 108, at 14
(describing the limitation on counsel under McNeil).
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2. Rejection of the Factually Related or Inextricably Intertwined
Exception
The opinion expressly rejected one of the lower-court-created
exceptions'12 to the offense-specific rule.' 3  Following the Court's
decision in McNeil, several federal" 4 and state courts"' established an
112. Holly Larsen, Note, United States v. Covarrubias: Does the Ninth Circuit Add to
the Ambiguity of the Inextricably Intertwined Exception?, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1,
13-34 (2000) (discussing the "inextricably intertwined" and "circumvention of right[s]"
exceptions to the offense-specific rule recognized by state and federal courts); see also
United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the two
separate exceptions), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
113. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168.
114. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223 (describing the establishment of the
"inextricably intertwined" exception in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits); United States
v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding the "closely related" or
"inextricably intertwined" exception did not apply in Melgar's case), abrogated by Texas v.
Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 42 (3d Cir. 1997)
(adopting the "closely related" exception), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162
(2001); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the
"inextricably intertwined" exception, but finding it inapplicable because of the context of
tribal arraignment), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); United States v.
Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment may attach to an uncharged offense that is "extremely closely
related" to a charged offense), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); United
States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying the related offense exception and
finding the case outside the exception); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir.
1992) (recognizing the "inextricably intertwined" exception); United States v. Cooper, 949
F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging and employing the "inextricably
intertwined" inquiry and finding that the two charges at issue are separate offenses);
United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1991) (prohibiting the
admission of incriminating statements regarding crimes that are closely related to charged
crimes). But cf. Helium v. Warden, United States Penitentiary-Leavenworth, 28 F.3d 903,
909 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the existence of the exception in another circuit, but
failing to adopt it). Prior to McNeil, the First Circuit indicated that a defendant might
enjoy extension of the Sixth Amendment right if the offenses were closely related. See
United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-8 (1st Cir. 1988) (acknowledging that the right to
counsel may apply to closely linked crimes but finding Nocella's offenses not closely
related because they were distinct from the charged crimes, and the exception did not
apply).
115. See Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1229 (Mass. 1997) (following
the general trend of other courts and adopting the "inextricably intertwined" test),
abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interprets the right to
counsel to extend from the charged offense to "all offenses arising from the same
incident"), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); Upton v. Texas, 853 S.W.2d
548, 555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (rejecting the application of McNeil's offense-specific
rule on the grounds that the charged offense of theft was very closely related to the
uncharged offense of capital murder), abrogated by State v. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.
App. 1994). Even before the offense-specific rule was developed in McNeil, the Supreme
Court of Illinois recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to
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exception for crimes which were "closely related factually" to the
charged offense." 6 Based on two Supreme Court cases, Brewer v.
Williams" 7 and Maine v. Moulton,"' the lower courts reasoned that the
protections of the Sixth Amendment should not be isolated from
uncharged offenses when they are intertwined with the charged
offenses."9
The Court rejected the notion that Brewer and Moulton supported the
lower courts' exceptions, partially because the decisions came prior to
McNeil.'2° More importantly, the Court asserted that Brewer and
Moulton did not specifically address whether the right to counsel
attached for factually related uncharged offenses, and therefore, the
cases should not be the basis for the inferences by the lower courts.
2
Additionally, the Court argued that Moulton acknowledged that the
constitutional right to counsel is offense-specific in nature, and therefore,
statements regarding uncharged offenses should not be suppressed.1
22
closely related offenses. People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-52 (I11. 1988) (asserting
that the Supreme Court's prior cases lead to an exception for closely related offenses).
116. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup;
Court Allows Some Police Interrogation Without Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at
A17 (noting that many courts have recognized that counsel extends to closely related
crimes); Barry Tarlow, Rico Report: S.D.N.Y. Suppresses Incriminating Statements
Obtained in the Absence of Counsel, 22 Champion 46 (1998) (acknowledging development
of the "closely related" exception in the circuits). Despite differing terminology used by
the lower courts, the "closely related" and "inextricably intertwined" exceptions are
considered interchangeable. See, e.g., Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224 n.7 (citing cases that
assert that the different phrases refer to a single exception).
117. 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1977) (holding that incriminating statements obtained
during an interrogation in the absence of counsel were inadmissible because Williams did
not waive his right to counsel).
118. 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (holding that when the police knowingly circumvent the
accused's right to counsel and elicit incriminating statements, those statements are
inadmissible).
119. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223-24 (pointing to Brewer and Moulton as the
basis for the "closely related" exception), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162
(2001); Arnold, 106 F.3d at 40 (same); Melgar, 139 F.3d at 1011-13 (same); Doherty, 126
F.3d at 776 (same); In re Pack, 616 A.2d at 1008-11 (relying on Moulton for justification);
Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 451-52 (asserting that Brewer supports the proposition that the
Sixth Amendment extends to closely related offenses); see also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 5, §
6.4(e)-(f) (surveying cases recognizing the "factually related" exception).
120. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168; see also Dolegowski, supra note 108, at 14 (expressing
doubt that Brewer and Moulton could be read as an exception when they predate McNeil).
121. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168-71; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 7, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (No. 99-1707) (asserting
that the issue presented in Cobb was never argued or mentioned in either Brewer or
Moulton).
122. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 170-71 (finding Moulton's assertion as to the admissibility
of certain statements precludes the meaning the lower courts have extended to the case);
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3. Adopting Blockburger's Double Jeopardy Test to Determine Whether
There Are Separate Offenses for Sixth Amendment Purposes
Finally, the majority adopted the test from Blockburger v. United
States'23 to ascertain if the right to counsel attaching to a charged offense,
may extend to an uncharged offense. 24  The Court created the
Blockburger test to determine if there are identical charges, thereby
avoiding multiple prosecutions in violation of the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy Clause.1 ' The inquiry regarding whether an act or
transaction creates two separate offenses, or only one, turns on whether
the elements of one offense require proof of a fact that the other offense
does not require.
126
The Cobb Court reasoned that the meaning of "offense" in the Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy context is not constitutionally
distinguishable from the meaning of the term in the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel realm.127 Therefore, the Court held that if an uncharged
crime is considered the same offense as the charged crime under the
Blockburger test, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would attach to
the uncharged offense.12 Applying this standard to the Cobb case, the
Court determined that a capital murder offense1 29 required proof of
different facts than a burglary offense,' 3° and therefore, the right to
counsel did not attach for both offenses.
13
'
see also Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180 (stating that the exclusion of evidence obtained prior to
the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would thwart society's interest in
investigating and resolving crimes); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986) (reading
Moulton as allowing statements made after the right to counsel attaches to be admissible
for uncharged crimes).
123. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (establishing the double jeopardy test).
124. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173.
125. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; see also Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173.
126. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; see also Kathryn A. Pamenter, Comment, United
States v. Dixon: The Supreme Court Returns to the Traditional Standard for Double
Jeopardy Clause Analysis, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 575, 578 (1994) (summarizing the
Blockburger test).
127. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173.
128. Id.; see also Dolegowski, supra note 108, at 14 (noting that the right to counsel
would attach for the uncharged murder if the Blockburger test is satisfied).
129. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon 1994) (requiring proof of
intentional murder of two people within the same transaction).
130. Id. § 30.02(a)(1) (requiring proof of entry into a habitation without consent from
the owner).
131. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174; see also Dolegowski, supra note 108, at 14 (observing the
Court's application of the Blockburger test to the facts of Cobb).
1375
Catholic University Law Review
B. The Concurrence. Advocating Overruling or Limiting Michigan v.
Jackson
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurred with
the majority in reaffirming the offense-specific rule.' 32 Additionally, the
concurrence asserted that Michigan v. Jackson33 should no longer be
followed.' 34 The Court premised Jackson on the reasoning that, after the
constitutional right to counsel attached, the accused could not be
approached by the police for interrogation in the absence of counsel,
unless the accused initiated the contact.' 35 The concurrence viewed the
Jackson Court's ruling as flawed because it formed a barrier to the
accused's voluntary choice to talk with the police alone, or with
counsel. 36 In Patterson v. Illinois,3 1 the Court asserted that the accused
should have the choice of whether or not to interact with the authorities
after asserting the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.' 38 The concurrence
noted that the reasoning in Patterson, involving a Fifth Amendment
waiver of counsel, should also apply to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because the Court's holding in Jackson drew upon the reasoning
of Fifth Amendment cases.131
Moreover, the concurrence argued that the rules established in
Miranda v. Arizona'4" and Edwards v. Arizona,4' on which Jackson
relied,14 require the accused to make a "clear and unambiguous"'43
invocation of the right to have counsel present in a custodial
132. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
134. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 628-30 (1986) (quoting People v. Bladel, 365
N.W.2d 56,68-69 (Mich. 1984)).
136. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. 487 U.S. 285, 291 (1988) (acknowledging that the accused may make the initial
choice of whether to speak to the police with or without the aid of counsel, as long as the
accused makes an informed decision).
138. Id. at 291 (arguing that a rule should not prevent the accused from speaking to
the police).
139. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 175 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (requiring police to cease an interrogation when the
accused has requested the assistance of counsel, and not to resume interrogation until
counsel is present).
141. 451 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1981) (invalidating a waiver of the right to counsel where
the accused had requested the assistance of counsel during a custodial interrogation, was
never furnished with such counsel, but nevertheless made a statement to police during a
subsequent interrogation).
142 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-36 (1986).
143. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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interrogation." Yet, the Sixth Amendment protections begin with the
commencement of a formal prosecution, and not at the accused's specific
assertion of the right. 45 According to the concurrence, because the
Edwards protections of the accused are independent of the attachment of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel after arraignment, the protective
rule should not apply, absent a specific election by the accused.'
46
The concurrence argued that the judge-made rule in Jackson is
problematic because it protects the accused's desire not to interact with
the authorities, without any showing that the accused had that intent.
4 7
The concurrence reasoned that if Jackson were to remain valid, its
protections should be limited to instances where there is a "clear and
unambiguous"' 48 assertion of the right to counsel by the accused.'49
C. The Dissent: Supporting the Alternative "Closely Related" or
"Inextricably Intertwined" Test for Determining the Attachment of the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg,
dissented on the grounds that the Court's definition of "offense" under
the test in Blockburger v. United States'O was too narrow and its
application undermined the protections of the Sixth Amendment.' The
dissent viewed the issue as whether the term "offense," in the Sixth
Amendment context, "includes factually related aspects of a single
course of conduct other then those few acts that make up the essential
elements of the crime charged."'52 The dissent's resolution was that the
144. Id. at 175-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel is not presumed, but must be requested); see also Jones, supra note 20, at 1058
(acknowledging the requirement that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel must be
invoked).
145. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also 21A AM. JUR. 2D, supra
note 13, § 1192 (triggering of Sixth Amendment does not hinge on a request by the
defendant).
146. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This is in direct conflict with
the reasoning in Jackson. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632 (arguing that the legal basis of
Edwards provides support for applying the same rule in Sixth Amendment cases).
147. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148. Id. The concurrence notes that Cobb did not request the assistance of counsel
during his interrogations and therefore enjoys no protection. See id.
149. Id.
150. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
151. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 179 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
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definition of "offense" for Sixth Amendment purposes includes those
aspects that are sufficiently factually related to the charged crime."'
1. Guiding Principles of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The dissent noted four principles underlying the constitutional right to
counsel.154 First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a critical facet
of providing a fair criminal prosecution.155 Second, the commencement
of formal criminal proceedings attaches to the right to counsel. 56 Third,
after the right has attached, the police are obligated, in most cases, to
interact with the accused through counsel, despite the accused's waiver of
his or her rights under the Fifth Amendment. 57  Finally, there are
limitations on the application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
that permit police to continue investigations of "new or additional
crimes"' 51 that are not the focus of the ongoing criminal proceeding. 59
2. Maintaining the Validity of the Jackson Decision
The dissent disagreed with the concurrence that Patterson v. Illinois','
undermined Michigan v. Jackson,6' and asserted that Patterson was
153. Id. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 177-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 177 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398
(1977) (noting the vital importance of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments in ensuring a fair criminal proceeding); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344 (1963) (discussing the historical safeguards in the state and federal constitutions aimed
at ensuring a fair trial); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 11.1(a) (asserting the justification for
the right to appointed counsel "arose out of the state's obligation to provide a fair
hearing").
156. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 177 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689-90 (1972) (describing the commencement of criminal proceedings as the point
when the adverse positions of the accused and the government have solidified); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (acknowledging the arraignment as the point where the
right to counsel attaches).
157. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 177 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (holding that statements resulting from a police-initiated
interrogation, after the accused's assertion of the right to counsel, are inadmissible
because any waiver under such circumstances is invalid); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
176 (1985) (noting that after formal charges have commenced, counsel becomes a
"medium" upon which the accused may rely during interactions with the government).
15& See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179.
159. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 178 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (invoking the Sixth Amendment right to counsel once does not
extend the right to every subsequent prosecution); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179-80
(recognizing the law enforcement interest in investigating crimes).
160. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
161. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
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distinguishable because the accused in that case had not accepted the
appointment of counsel.' 62  Moreover, the dissent rejected the
proposition that the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to speak with
police adequately protects the full scope of the accused's constitutional
rights to the assistance of counsel.
163
The dissent argued that the Sixth Amendment principle underlying
Jackson sought to provide fairness in criminal proceedings by not forcing
the layperson to confront the government adversary absent the aid of
counsel.' 64 The dissent noted that, in addition to the ruling in Jackson,
Rule 4.2 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct' forbids lawyers from taking advantage of a person who is not
assisted by counsel.'66  Thus, the dissent asserted that the Sixth
162 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 181 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Patterson, the Court specifically
acknowledged the significance of Patterson's lack of legal representation. Patterson, 487
U.S. at 290 n.3. Moreover, the Court asserted that different constitutional protections are
implicated when there is representation of counsel or a request for assistance. Id.
163. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 179-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also People v. Bladel, 365
N.W.2d 56, 63 (Mich. 1984) (asserting that Miranda may not provide as much protection as
the Sixth Amendment demands) affd sub nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
But see Colb, supra note 35 (arguing that Miranda alone is enough to provide adequate
protection of the defendant's rights during an interrogation).
164. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 180 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (recognizing that the right to counsel has extended beyond trial to
other points in the pretrial proceedings so as to level the playing field between the
defendant and his expert adversary); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938)
(pointing to the complexities of the criminal justice system as necessitating the assistance
of counsel).
165. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999) ("In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a
person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.").
166. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. (1999) (commenting that
the purpose of Rule 4.2 is to preserve the lawyer-client relationship in part by preventing
lawyers from taking advantage of defendants); see also Cobb, 532 U.S. at 181 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Many states have enacted "no-contact" rules patterned after Rule 4.2. See
Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The Right to Counsel After 'Cobb': Is There
Anything Left?, 225 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2001) (discussing local no-contact rules); Greenhouse,
supra note 116, at A17 (reporting that all fifty states have enacted rules limiting contact).
Contacts between prosecutors and defendants are also addressed in Rule 3.8(b). ANN.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (1996). The rule requires prosecutors to
take reasonable measures assuring that defendants know they have a right to, know how
to obtain, and have been given a chance to obtain counsel. Id. Commentary on Rule
3.8(b) states that the rule is applicable during the investigatory stage. ANN. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1996).
In 1998, Congress enacted the McDade law, which makes attorneys representing the
federal government subject to state laws and rules. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp. V 2000).
Thus, federal prosecutors are bound by the same no-contact rules as their state
counterparts. See James S. Montana, Jr. & John A. Galotto, Right to Counsel: Courts
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Amendment protections, as established in Jackson, are distinct and
independent from the Fifth Amendment guarantees, yet equally
important. 67
3. The Potential for Abuse Under the Court's Holding
Additionally, the dissent expressed concern that, due to the length and
detail of criminal codes, prosecutors would be able to take advantage of
the inevitable overlap of statutory provisions by charging several
offenses, all stemming from the same criminal incident."1  Under the
Court's ruling in Cobb, the police are permitted to question anyone
charged with a crime about any related, although uncharged, offense
without informing counsel.' 6' The dissent asserted that the Court's
approach would negate an important facet of the Sixth Amendment
protection by allowing police a manner by which to exclude counsel for
the accused in interrogations.'7"
Adhere to Bright-Line Limits, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2001, at 4, 15 (explaining the
application of the McDade law). Moreover, violations of statutory ethics rules by
prosecutors may justify exclusion of evidence. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d
834, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding exclusion of evidence within the court's discretion
where an ethical breach has occurred). The Second Circuit also asserted in Hammad that
the ethics rule applies before indictment, as contrasted with the Sixth Amendment. See id.
at 839. However, several courts are hesitant to establish a rule allowing exclusion of
evidence based on breaches of ethics rules. Montana, supra at 16 (citing cases illustrating
the reluctance of courts to exclude evidence due to ethics violations). Nevertheless, the
harshness of the offense-specific restriction on the right to counsel may be mitigated if
courts construe violations of ethics rules, similar to 4.2 and 3.8(b), as grounds for excluding
evidence obtained in the absence of counsel. Id. at 17 (arguing that courts should use
these rules to provide greater protection to defendants); see also Abramowitz, supra at 3
(noting that the no-contact rules could fill the gap after Cobb's limit on the Sixth
Amendment right during interrogations).
167. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 181 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625, 632 (1986) (arguing that in the context of the post-arraignment interrogation, the
protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are just as important as the Fifth
Amendment right in the context of a custodial interrogation); People v. Bladel, 365
N.W.2d 56, 68 (Mich. 1984) (noting that courts have considered the Sixth Amendment
right to be equally, if not more important than the Fifth Amendment's judge-made right to
counsel), affd sub nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
168. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Greenhouse, supra note
116, at A17 (reporting the dissent's concern as to the manipulation of the interrogation
and charging process).
169. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Abramowitz, supra
note 166 (summarizing the dissent's discussion of the problem of the ease for potential
abuse by authorities under the Court's ruling); Thomas Healy, Justices Make Police
Questioning Easier, ADVOC., Apr. 3, 2001, at 16C (noting that the decision will enable
police to avoid the accused's counsel).
170. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 183 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 169 and
accompanying text. But see David G. Savage, Supreme Court Clarifies Suspect's Right to
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4. Questioning the Majority's Use of Blockburger and Proposing an
Alternative
The dissent also questioned the appropriateness of using the test from
Blockburger v. United States7' to determine the meaning of "offense" in
Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases. 72 The dissent asserted that use
of the Blockburger test would only serve to complicate the Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.' The dissent noted that, in practice, the
Blockburger test has been "extraordinarily difficult" for judges and
lawyers to apply in the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy context.
174
Moreover, the dissent argued that adopting the test into the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel context would require police officers to
apply Blockburger when interrogating suspects, leading to inevitable
challenges charging improper application.' 75
Alternatively, the dissent advocated the adoption of the "closely
related to" or "inextricably intertwined with" tests to define "offense."'
76
Under either of these concepts, the definition of "offense" encompasses
factually related crimes committed during the same course of conduct as
the particular crime charged. 77 The dissent noted that many of the lower
courts defined "offense," within the context of the Sixth Amendment, to
Lawyer, L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 2001, at 13 (quoting Eric Freedman, a law professor of
Hofstra University, as viewing the Cobb decision as a minor alteration of the law).
171. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
172 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 184-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the "same elements" test
unsuitable for answering the Sixth Amendment counsel question).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that within the practicing and
academic legal communities there is disagreement in application of the test). For a
specific example of the lack of consistency in applying the Blockburger test, see United
States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108 (1985) (per curiam). But see State v. Vassos, 579
N.W.2d 335, 343 (Wis. 1998) (stating that Blockburger is simple and easy to apply);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (No. 99-1702)
(arguing that the "same elements" test furthers predictability and consistency).
175. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the police will
fare no better in applying Blockburger than judges and lawyers). But see Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 174, at 25 (suggesting that the elements test is easier for police
to apply); Brief for U.S., supra note 121, at 13 (asserting that Blockburger is the proper
test because its focus on elements is familiar to police).
176. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Montana, supra note 166, at
15 (recognizing the dissent's suggestion of using the inextricably intertwined inquiry).
177. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Larson, supra note
112, at 13-22, 25-30 (summarizing the factors considered by the courts to determine
whether the right to counsel has attached for offenses arising from the same act or
transaction).
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include "closely related" acts. 78 The dissent argued that either of the two
alternatives would be easier to apply than the Blockburger test because
of the common sense nature of the alternatives.79
III. THE DIMINUTION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
RESULTING FROM TEXAS V. COBB
The Cobb Court's extension of the offense-specific limitation on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is clearly favorable to law
enforcement. ' ° The Cobb decision is consistent with the trend illustrated
by Patterson v. Illinois"'1 and McNeil v. Wisconsin, 82 which places the
government's crime-solving objectives above the rights of defendants.'
However, by continuing down this path, the Court is undermining prior
Sixth Amendment cases that provide defendants with protections
afforded by the assistance of counsel.'8
A. Taking Away With One Hand What the Court Gave With the Other
The Court does not overrule Michigan v. Jackson,""l but the legal
underpinnings of the decision are drastically eroded.' 6 Little remains of
178. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 186-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see, e.g., United States v.
Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223-25 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S.
162 (2001); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1998), abrogated by
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); Taylor v. State, 726 So. 2d 841, 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999); State v. Tucker, 645 A.2d 111, 120-21 (N.J. 1994).
179. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 187 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see Brief for U.S., supra note
121, at 26 (arguing that the "factually related" test would be unworkable because officers
are often unaware of all facts surrounding a crime, and therefore, unable to ascertain
whether the right to counsel is implicated); McSpadden, supra note 92 (quoting Robert T.
Scully, NAPO's Executive Director, as arguing against the "inextricably intertwined" test
because it would require police to function like attorneys in making legal determinations
whether when one crime might be closely related factually to another crime).
180. See Savage, supra note 170, at 13 (noting that the Cobb decision makes it easier
for the police to interrogate suspects in absence of counsel); see also Andrew Tallmer,
Juris Prudent: Recent Legal Cases of Interest to Law Enforcement, at http:www.
jus.state.nc.us/NCJA/cobb.htm (asserting that Cobb is favorable to law enforcement
because it limits the extent of the Sixth Amendment); A Weekly Summary of Snippets of
Justice From the Federal Courts, Punch and Jurists Weekly Newsletter (Punch & Jurists,
Ltd., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 12, 2001, at http://www.fedcrimlaw.com/visitors/
punchltd/2001/03-12-01.html (stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Cobb
"stressed the law and order philosophy of the current Court").
181. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
182. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
183. See Garcia, supra note 16, at 72-75 (discussing the subordination of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in the rationales of Patterson and McNeil).
184. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the protections of
Jackson, Moulton, and Brewer that are undermined by the Court's holding).
185. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
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the broad holding of Jackson, which established that the police are
barred from initiating contact with the accused after the attachment or
invocation of counsel.' 7 By interpreting the meaning of "offense" under
the narrow Blockburger test, the Jackson Court's grant of protection
from unaided interrogation after arraignment rings hollow.'
8
The concurrence argued that the Court should have gone a step
further in Cobb by overruling Jackson.'8 Based on the opinion that
Jackson prevents the free choice of the accused to confess to the police,
the concurrence decries the decision as an unwise judge-made rule.' 9
However, Jackson does not prevent the accused from confessing to the
police if the accused initiates contact with the police voluntarily.'9'
Jackson simply sought to prevent the police from circumventing the Sixth
Amendment by prohibiting police initiated questioning in the absence of
counsel at a "critical stage" of the prosecution.'9
B. By Rejecting the "Inextricably Intertwined" Exception, the Court
Ignores Prior Case Law
In rejecting the factually related exception created by the lower courts,
the Cobb Court dismissed the idea that the exception could be read into
the Court's jurisprudence.9 3 However, the dissent noted that, while not
186. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Abramowitz, supra note
166, at 3 (noting that the Cobb decision "pulls the rug out from under" Jackson);
Greenhouse, supra note 116, at 17A (reporting the precedential status of Jackson);
Snippets of Justice, supra note 180 (discussing the Court's treatment of Jackson).
187. 532 U.S. at 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's decision gives
the police too much latitude in questioning).
188. See Abramowitz, supra note 166, at 3 (discussing the evisceration of Jackson by
the Cobb holding).
189. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that a defendant can willingly go to
the police and confess); see also Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld & Sheri Klintworth, Right To
Counsel, 89 GEO. L.J. 1485, 1486 n.1466 (2001) (explaining that Jackson allows a valid
waiver if the defendant initiates communication with the authorities); Kimberly A.
Crawford, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Applications and Limitations, 70 FBI
L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., 27, 30 (2001) (stating that once the right to counsel is invoked, a
valid waiver can be attained only if the accused initiates contact with the police).
192. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-32 (1986) (asserting that the
protections provided by the Sixth Amendment were designed to provide the accused with
assistance when confronting the police and that the government should not attempt to
evade the rights of the accused).
193. Cobb, 532 U.S. 168-171; see also Dolegowski, supra note 108, at 14 (describing the
Court's rejection of Brewer and Moulton as support for an exception to McNeil);
Montana, supra note 166, at 14 (criticizing the Court's decision to dispense with the
exception).
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addressing the exact issue of the right to counsel attaching for uncharged
offenses, Brewer v. Williams'94 and Maine v. Moulton 95 illustrated that
the Sixth Amendment implicitly assumed the right extended to factually
related, but uncharged, crimes.' In Brewer, the defendant had been
arraigned on a charge of abduction and had retained counsel.'9 While
being transported to another location, the police elicited incriminating
statements from Williams about the location of the abducted child's
body. 19' Subsequently, Williams was indicted for murdering the child.19
Williams' statements to the police were introduced as evidence in the
murder trial, and he was found guilty."l
The Supreme Court determined that Williams' waiver of the right to
counsel was invalid, and the statements should not have been admitted."'
In this instance, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had formally
attached to the abduction charge.2 O However, the Court invalidated
Williams' statements regarding the uncharged murder offense."" Lower
courts relied on the result in Brewer as support for the "closely related
factually" exception.2'O
194. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
195. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
196. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 184 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also People v. Clankie, 530
N.E.2d 448, 451-52 (111. 1988) (reviewing Brewer and Moulton and concluding that "[t]he
United States Supreme Court has thus apparently assumed that Sixth Amendment rights
of one formally charged with an offense extend to offenses closely related to that
offense").
197. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390-91.
198. Id. at 392-93. The police officer, knowing Williams to be religious, engaged him
in a conversation discussing the need for the dead child to have a proper religious burial.
Id. at 393, 403. Consequently, Brewer is also referred to as the "Christian Burial Speech"
case. Id. at 392; see also Crawford, supra note 191, at 31 n.12; Montana, supra note 166, at
14; Colb, supra note 36.
199. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 393.
200. Id. at 394.
201. See id. at 405-06. The Court was convinced that Williams had not willingly
waived his right to counsel, because his words and actions indicated a continuing reliance
on his counsel. See id. at 404. The Court acknowledged that it was only after coercive
psychological pressure from the police officer that Williams made the incriminating
statements. Id. at 402-03. One of the concurring opinions noted that the majority's
decision drew a proper distinction between good police work and outright police
misconduct. See id. at 408 (Marshall, J., concurring).
202. See id. at 400-01.
203. See id. at 405-06.
204. See United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999) (asserting
that the Court implicitly applied the "inextricably intertwined" exception in Brewer),
abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d
1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating the Brewer Court recognized that the charges were
"closely related"); see also Dolegowski, supra note 108, at 14 (discussing the reliance on
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In Maine v. Moulton,0 5 the defendant was indicted on four counts of
theft.2  Later, a co-defendant, acting on behalf of the police, questioned
Moulton.2° Moulton made incriminating statements to the co-defendant,
which were recorded and used against him at trial.2  The state dismissed
the pending charges, but it obtained seven other indictments against
Moulton, including the same previous charges and additional indictments
for burglary, arson, and three other thefts.29 At Moulton's trial, some of
the recorded statements to the co-defendant were offered into
evidence.10 The court convicted Moulton for burglary and theft. 1
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Moulton's constitutional right
to counsel was violated because the police intentionally circumvented his
right to have counsel present at the questioning.t 2 The Court affirmed
the lower court ruling that a new trial should be granted on both the
burglary and the theft charges.2 3 Moulton had not been indicted for
burglary at the time the police obtained the incriminating statements; he
had only been indicted for theft . 4 Yet, the Court held the statements
regarding the burglary were inadmissible because they were obtained in
the absence of counsel, after the right had attached for the theft
indictments.2 5  As with Brewer, lower courts used the rationale in
Brewer by the lower courts). Prior to McNeil, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that
Brewer supported the concept that the right to counsel extends to closely factually related
offenses. People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-52 (Il. 1988) (explaining the Court's
disposition in Brewer as an assumption that closely related crimes are all covered by the
Sixth Amendment).
205. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
206. Id. at 162.
207. Id. at 164-65. Gary Colson, the co-defendant of Perley Moulton, agreed to testify
against Moulton and cooperate in the investigation. Id. at 163-64.
208. Id. at 164-66. Moulton made the incriminating statements in a face-to-face
meeting with Colson. Id.
209. Id. at 167.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 176-77. The Court acknowledged that incriminating statements obtained
"by luck or happenstance" after the right to counsel has attached are still admissible
against the accused. Id. at 176. However, in instances where it can be demonstrated that
the State was reasonably certain of obtaining incriminating statements, when counsel is
not present in the questioning, the statements cannot be used as evidence. Id. at 176 n.12;
see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-73 (1980) (holding Henry's conviction
invalid because police "deliberately elicited" incriminating statements).
213. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180.
214. See id. at 162.
215. See id. at 179-80 (discussing the Sixth Amendment limitations on the
government's ability to obtain and admit evidence which has been obtained in an
interrogation in the absence of counsel).
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Moulton to provide a basis for the "inextricably intertwined"
exception.1 6
The Court refused to read Brewer and Moulton as the lower courts had
because both cases predated McNeil, and neither case addressed whether
the right to counsel attached for uncharged offenses "inextricably
intertwined" with the charged crime."17 Yet, as argued by lower courts,
the right to counsel would be easily circumvented if the police merely
had to charge the accused with a related offense to facilitate questioning
regarding a whole host of other connected offenses."1 8
216. See United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223-25 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding
that Moulton implied the attachment of the right to counsel to "closely related" offenses),
abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005,
1011-13 (4th Cir. 1998) (asserting that lower courts rely on Moulton in extending the right
to counsel to "inextricably intertwined" offenses), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S.
162 (2001); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1997) (arguing that the
Court's reversal of both the theft and the burglary convictions evidenced a recognition of
the close relation of the crimes), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); United
States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Moulton as supporting
the extension of counsel to closely intertwined offenses); In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1008-
11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001). Even before
the creation of the offense-specific limitation, the Supreme Court of Illinois viewed
Moulton as implying that the right to counsel covered closely related uncharged offenses.
See People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-52 (111. 1988). However, Justice O'Connor
argued in Moran v. Burbine that "[t]he Court [in Moulton] made clear, however, that the
evidence concerning the crime for which the defendant had not been indicted -- evidence
obtained in precisely the same manner from the identical suspect -- would be admissible at
a trial limited to those charges." 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986).
217. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162,168-171 (2001); see also Montana, supra note 166, at
14 (discussing the Court's rejection of the two cases as support for an exception);
Dolegowski, supra note 108, at 14 (summarizing the Court's view of the inapplicability of
Brewer and Moulton).
218. See Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41 (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
should not be isolated from uncharged, but related crimes because the protections of the
right could be avoided by the police); In re Pack, 616 A.2d at 1011 (asserting that counsel
attaching for one charged offense will extend to other charges arising from the same
criminal transaction in order to prevent police from circumventing the accused's right to
counsel by charging additional related crimes); see also Anne Gearan, Court: Cops Can
Probe Without Lawyer, Am. Sovereign, at http://www.americansovereign.com/articles/
righttocounsel.htm (quoting Lawrence S. Goldman, vice president of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), as arguing that Cobb gives the
government the power to evade a defendant's right to counsel). But see id. (quoting
Stephen McSpadden, counsel for NAPO, as asserting that police need to have the ability
to question on new leads, and the fact that a crime is closely related should not jeopardize
the admissibility of the statement); McSpadden, supra note 92 (advancing NAPO's
position that suppressing voluntary statements of the accused would greatly reduce crime
resolution and efficiency); Brief for U.S., supra note 121, at 26-8 (arguing that voluntary
confessions are essential to police efforts to solve crime and that there is no justification
for interfering with this interest by extending the right to counsel to uncharged related
offenses).
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C. Adopting the Inadequacies of the Blockburger Test Into the Sixth
Amendment Context Threatens the Right to Counsel
The Cobb Court's adoption of the Blockburger test for Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence is problematic.29 As noted by the dissent, the
Blockburger test has not been applied consistently in double jeopardy
cases2 - Moreover, the Blockburger test has been criticized in both case
law22' and legal commentary.22 Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that
the test is "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the
most intrepid judicial navigator." 3 Additionally, the Court's view of the
Blockburger test has not been consistent.24
Justice Brennan advocated a "same transaction ''22' approach in
determining the meaning of "offense" in the Fifth Amendment Double
Jeopardy Clause context. 26 The Court has expressly rejected adoption of
219. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 184-85 (Breyer, J. dissenting); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 187 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's lack of clarity in defining
the limits of the offense-specific rule and asserting a hope that the Court would not choose
to fashion the boundaries after the double jeopardy test); Montana, supra note 166, at 14-5
(arguing that the Court's use of Blockburger is ill-conceived because of the formalistic
nature of the test).
220. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (giving an example of the
inconsistency resulting from an application of the Blockburger test by the Supreme
Court); compare United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697-700 (1993) (concluding under
the Blockburger test that the crime of contempt constitutes the same offense as the
underlying crime) with Dixon, 509 U.S. at 716-720 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (identifying the two crimes as separate offenses after applying the
Blockburger test).
221. See State v. Vassos, 579 N.W.2d 35, 41-43 (Wis. 1998) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Blockburger test is inadequate to protect against double jeopardy);
People v. Robideau, 355 N.W.2d 592, 603 (Mich. 1984) (rejecting the Blockburger test as
questionable and non-determinative of legislative intent behind the meaning of
"offense").
222. See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807,
1814 (1997) ("Blockburger, it seems, is a mess, legally and logically."); Pamenter, supra
note 126, at 596 (concluding that the Court's return to the original Blockburger test is too
narrow of an interpretation of defendants' rights under the Fifth Amendment Double
Jeopardy Clause).
223. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
224. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990) (establishing a two-prong analysis
including the Blockburger test, and the additional inquiry of whether the same conduct
proved in one prosecution is used to establish an essential element of the second offense in
the second prosecution), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). But see
Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 (overruling Grady and expressly rejecting the same conduct inquiry
as inconsistent with the Court's jurisprudence).
225. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing
that any crimes resulting from a single act, or transaction should be considered the same
offense for the purposes of prosecution and the double jeopardy protection).
226. See id.
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the transaction test.27 However, in Grady v. Corbin2' the Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Brennan, adopted a same-conduct inquiry to
be added to the traditional Blockburger test.29 Under this concept, a
second prosecution would not be permitted if, in an effort to prove an
essential element of the second offense, the prosecution would have to
prove conduct constituting the prior offense already prosecuted. '
Nevertheless, the Court overruled Grady in United States v. Dixon 2 M and
reestablished the single analysis of Blockburger.
2 32
The "closely related" alternative is predicated on a similar
consideration of the conduct involved in a single criminal transaction.233
Several of the lower courts that developed the "inextricably intertwined"
exception considered the conduct involved to be a crucial element in
determining whether the exception appliesZ-4 A rule that considers the
underlying conduct of a single criminal transaction when determining the
227. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985); see also Pamenter, supra note
126, at 596 (discussing the Court's refusal to recognize the "same transaction" test).
228. 495 U.S. 508, 523 (1990) (holding that, because of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the prior conviction for drunk driving and failing to stay on the correct side of the road
barred prosecution for manslaughter, homicide, and assault as conduct from the two
convicted offenses would be used to prove the later three crimes), overruled by United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
229. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510; see also Pamenter, supra note 126, at 581-82 (summarizing
the Court's alteration of the Blockburger analysis).
230. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521-22 (discussing the proper inquiry as to proof of conduct in
addition to the Blockburger test).
231. 509 U.S. 688 ('1993) (holding that Grady's same conduct test was wrong, and by
overruling the decision, prosecution of some counts against Dixon were not barred).
232. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 (rejecting Grady as lacking precedential support). But
see id. at 749-61 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing In re Neilsen,
131 U.S. 176 (1889), Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam), and Illinois v.
Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980), as support for the rationale and holding in Grady).
233. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 186 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting an instance
where the police violate a defendant's right to counsel).
234. See United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1999) (articulating
the factors to be considered in whether the exception applies: facts, circumstances,
conduct, locus of the crime, timing, and victim), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162
(2001); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing the
"closely related" to exception as requiring the same victims, place, conduct and time),
abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 42
(3d Cir. 1997) (listing factors to consider for the "closely related" exception including:
witnesses, facts and circumstances, time, and conduct), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532
U.S. 162 (2001).
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meaning of the term "offense" for the purposes of the constitutional right
to counsel "comports with common sense. '
Moreover, Cobb argued that defining "offense" to include factually
related offenses with the same underlying conduct would aid in
preventing the police from intentionally trying to evade the Sixth
Amendment counsel guarantees. 26  The Court criticized Cobb for
providing no support for this "parade of horribles." 37  However, the
dissent noted a valid concern that law enforcement officials would
develop ways to circumvent the accused's right to counsel by relying on
overlapping statutory language.2 The FBI advocates finding ways to
circumvent suspects' rights:
[F]ollowing the Supreme Court's decision in Cobb, agencies
should not be reluctant to engage in creative charging. If there
is probable cause to believe that one individual has committed
numerous crimes, agencies can charge that individual, secure
their [sic] arrest, and proceed with the prosecution on one
crime, thereby allowing continued investigation of other
separate offenses unhampered by Sixth Amendment
protections. 239
In light of suggested FBI tactics, the dissent is justified in worrying that
the government may view a single criminal incident as violating a vast
number of criminal offenses, allowing for greater latitude in questioning
suspects.
240
235. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 187 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Montana, supra note
166, at 15 (characterizing the dissent's approach as a sensible alternative to Blockburger).
236. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Arnold, 106 F.3d at
40-1 (reasoning that the right to counsel should extend to uncharged, but related, crimes to
ensure the protections of the right could not be avoided by the police); In re Pack, 616
A.2d 1006, 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (arguing against a rule which would allow police to
circumvent the accused's right to counsel by charging additional related crimes).
237. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 171. During oral argument before the Court, Cobb's counsel
argued that limiting the right only to the charged offense would allow for increased police
contact with uncounseled defendants, thereby increasing the possibility for abuse. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 174, at 40-3.
238. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Gearan, supra note 218
(quoting the vice president of NACDL as saying that the ruling promotes the
circumvention of the right to counsel).
239. Crawford, supra note 191, at 31 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For
example, the document advocates the use of a cell mate for questioning the accused,
without counsel, regarding uncharged related offenses as a creative charging technique.
Id. Moreover, because of the leeway provided by Cobb, the FBI stresses that policies and
practices of law enforcement agencies should be crafted as to maximize obtaining
confessions. See id.
240. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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D. The Implications of Cobb for Defense Counsel
Earlier Supreme Court cases recognized the importance of counsel for
the accused.24 The Court viewed the right to counsel as an integral
element of ensuring fairness in the criminal justice system.242 However,
the Court's decision in Patterson v. Illinois'43 framed the assistance of
counsel at a post-indictment interrogation as being practically
superfluous!" Through the establishment of McNeil's offense-specific
rule, which narrowed the application of the right further, the Court
seemed to indicate that the importance of counsel diminished at the
point where the government commenced criminal proceedings.2 45
The Cobb decision further reinforced the idea that the role of counsel
is less important by extending the scope of the offense-specific rule.
246
The concurrence implied that counsel's presence hinders effective law
enforcement, because the presence of counsel impedes police and
voluntary defendant confessions.47 Not only is the importance of counsel
severely diminished after Cobb, but defense counsel must now advise the
accused as to every possible danger involved with talking to the police
regarding any subject matter.248
IV. CONCLUSION
In reaffirming McNeil's offense-specific rule, the Cobb Court's
clarification of when the right to counsel attaches for related, but
241. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,343-44 (1963) (assessing the fundamental
nature of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57
(1932) (discussing the necessity that defendants have the assistance of counsel prior to and
during their trials).
242. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44 (noting fairness as a key principle in the criminal
system); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (arguing that the Sixth
Amendment protections recognize that the criminal system is complex, and that counsel is
necessary to ensure a fair process).
243. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
244. Id. at 294 n.6 (asserting that the attorney's function at a post-indictment
interrogation is limited and one-dimensional).
245. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 183 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Court's ruling views defense counsel as a barrier to justice); see also
Garcia, supra note 16, at 103 (arguing that the Court's decisions are undermining the
constitutional importance of counsel).
246. See Abramowitz, supra note 166, at 3 (viewing the Cobb Court's decision as
resting on a theory that defense counsel obstructs justice).
247. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175-76 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
248. See Abramowitz, supra note 166, at 3 (noting that Cobb requires counsel to
initially advise their clients to refuse to speak to the police about any subject by evoking
the Fifth Amendment).
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uncharged offenses, removes vital protections provided by the Sixth
Amendment. By striking the balance in favor of crime resolution, the
Court allows government authorities to question a person regarding an
uncharged crime that may have occurred simultaneously with the
charged offense. In applying the Blockburger test to determine when the
right to counsel attaches for uncharged offenses, the Court allows all of
the Blockburger test's inconsistencies and inadequacies to complicate the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence. Instead, the
"inextricably intertwined" test should provide the framework for
determining whether the right to counsel, which has attached for a
charged offense, extends to an uncharged offense. The "inextricably
intertwined" inquiry would reduce the potential for police circumvention
of the defendants' rights.
The Court's decision in Texas v. Cobb does not advance the
protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Instead, the decision inhibits effective assistance and advising by defense
counsel. More importantly, the ruling diminishes the accused's right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment by applying the Blockburger test
and narrowly construing the meaning of "offense," so that the right only
attaches to charged offenses.
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